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ABSTRACT. Developers of tomorrow’s Command and
Control centers are facing numerous problems related
to the vast amount of available information obtained
from various sources. On a lower level, huge amounts
of uncertain reports from different sensors need to be
fused into comprehensible information. On a higher
level, representation and management of the aggregated
information will be the main task, with the overall
objective to provide reliable and comprehensible situation
awareness to commanders. Hence, we consider prediction
of future course of events being a necessary ingredient.
Unfortunately, traditional agent modeling techniques
do not capture gaming situations, i.e., situations where
commanders make decisions based on other commanders’
reasoning about one’s own reasoning. To cope with this
problem, we propose an architecture based on game
theory for inference, coupled with traditional methods for
uncertainty modeling. Applying an example, we show
that our architecture could be used as a decision support
tool, offering enhanced situation awareness in Command
and Control. Finally, we wind up with a philosophical
discussion regarding the ambiguities and the difﬁculties
in interpreting the solution that game theory offers in the
form of mixed strategy Nash equilibria.
1. INTRODUCTION
This article is based on previous research[2] where we
argued that game-theoretic reasoning should be used for
decision-making in command centers that need to make
decisions regarding long-term goals. These situations
arise in Command and Control (C2) where the decision
situation is characterized by its multi-agent planning per-
spective where one wants to make predictions using his-
toric events as well as make look-ahead predictions in a
manner similar to using game-trees.
Hence, the typical civilian example scenario is a disaster
relief scenario and the typical military example is a C2
scenario where commanders make long-term decisions on
the operative level. In a data fusion context these situa-
tions belong to “threat prediction” according to the well-
accepted JDL model[14]. This has been recognized in for
example [9] where the authors suggest the use of game-
theoretic algorithms for the estimation process in higher
level data fusion.
One goal of artiﬁcial intelligence (AI)[12] has been to cre-
ate expert systems, i.e., systems that can, provided the ap-
propriate domain knowledge, match the performance of
human experts. Such systems do not yet exist, other than
in highly speciﬁc domains, but AI research has implied
that researchers from widely differing ﬁelds have come
together in order to solve questions regarding knowledge
representation, decision-making, autonomous planning,
etc. Theresultsprovideagoodgroundfortheconstruction
of C2 decision support systems. During the last decade,
the intelligent agent perspective has lead to a view of AI
as a system of agents embedded in real environments with
continuous sensory inputs. We believe that this is a vi-
able way to reason about Command and Control decision-
making and we adopt the agent perspective throughout
this paper.
The basic elements that we use for reasoning about uncer-
tainty are random variables. General joint distributions
of more than a handful such variables are impossible to
handle efﬁciently, and the way to model distributions as
Bayesian networks (BN) has become a key tool in many
modeling tasks[10]. An inﬂuence diagram is a natural ex-
tension to a BN, incorporating decision and utility nodes
in addition to chance nodes. It represents decision prob-
lems for a single agent. Decision nodes represent points
where the decision maker has to choose a particular ac-
tion. Utilitynodesrepresentterminalnodeswheretheuse-
fulness for the decision maker is calculated. Inﬂuence di-
agrams can be evaluated bottom-up by dynamic program-
ming to obtain a sequence of maximum utility decisions.
A problem with ordinary AI tools is that they do not
capture “gaming situations” where one wants to reason
about opposing agents acting according to beliefs about
one’s own actions. This situation is not possible to
model in an inﬂuence diagram or BN without additional
machinery[12].
In this paper we illustrate the game-theoretic analysis
techniques with a concrete example on the tactical level.
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Section 3 introduces game-theoretic reasoning and section
4 discusses the building blocks in more detail. Section 5
gives a brief background to the C2 problem area and our
previous results that we build upon. Section 6 discusses
how to address the gaming problem arisen in the scenario
and solves it. Section 7 addresses the problems and pos-
sibilities that the ambiguities typical for a game-theoretic
solution pose. Finally, section 8 concludes and discusses
future research.
2. SCENARIO H¨ ARN ¨ OSAND
The scenario has been constructed by researchers, with
some help from a domain expert, in order to be useful for
speciﬁc research questions rather than being an example
of a realistic C2 decision situation. The scenario map is
depicted in Fig. 1.
Figure 1. The scenario map. Copyright Lantm¨ ateriverket
2004. From GSD-Topographic Map reference no.
M2004/4017.
2.1. Northern Sweden 2020
Tension has grown gradually in the Baltic Sea during the
last years. As a consequence, the Swedish armed forces
have been provided with resources in order to maintain
units that are on continuous alert. At the out-break of
the invasion, a number of events happen at the same time,
some that are immediately considered as threats and some
that may or may not be threats.
At 01:00 a red (enemy) force disembarks 50 km north of
the city of H¨ arn¨ osand (region north). Reports from civil-
ians make it likely that the force consists of two heav-
ily armed tank companies and one mechanized infantry
ﬁghting company. At about the same time, the coast
guard reports that a large leakage of oil has been dis-
covered in the region and that several unidentiﬁed cargo
ships has been sighted heading towards H¨ arn¨ osand. Our
own (blue) battalion-sized troops reside near H¨ arn¨ osand
in region center, consisting of one tank company and
one artillery formation protecting the motorway connect-
ing region center with region south. Apart from these
units, a staff company together with various resources for
surveillance and reconnaissance are located in the centre
of H¨ arn¨ osand. Moreover, home guard patrols of varying
size and possibilities may be deployed locally on various
places throughout the region.
The (blue) commanders in H¨ arn¨ osand estimate, almost
instantly, that the overall (red) enemy goal is to estab-
lish a bridgehead by gaining control over the harbor in
H¨ arn¨ osand. This is a natural assumption as the H¨ arn¨ osand
harbor is the only port in the area that allows for big ves-
sels to approach in order to set off a large-scale invasion.
The battalion’s unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) group is
ordered to perform reconnaissance with focus on the main
roads leading to H¨ arn¨ osand, i.e., the possible avenues of
approach for other possible enemy units.
At 01:20 one of the two available UAVs spot a tank com-
pany in region south heading north on the motorway E4.
The battalion commander makes the assumption that the
main goal for the tank company is to secure the bridge
along the E4 that connects region south with region cen-
ter.
At 01:30 a home guard patrol reports that enemy tanks
have taken position at a petrol station in region north. At
the same time the earlier-mentioned bridge along the E4
is being blown up by another home guard patrol.
At 01:32 the artillery unit in region center directs ﬁre to-
wards the petrol station using coordinates that have been
supplied by the home guard patrol. The home guard patrol
reports that a big fuel explosion has made the petrol sta-
tion blow up as well as neutralizing several enemy tanks
that were located within the petrol station at the time of
the explosion. The tanks that are not damaged, about the
size of a platoon, continue south.
At 01:45 reconnaissance personnel at the crossroad in
¨ Alandsbro report that the remainder of the blown-up tank
company from the petrol station heads west while the in-
tact tank company continues south towards H¨ arn¨ osand.
2.2. The Need for Reasoning
At this point the blue battalion commander faces his ﬁrst
real problem where he needs to reason about the situation.
Until now the commanders have been faced with several
tasks that require the use of their units, C2 system, etc.,
but these tasks have all been straightforward with few real
choices for the commander to reason about.
The report from ¨ Alandsbro makes it apparent that the in-
tact company heading for H¨ arn¨ osand is approaching the
city in order to, at one time or another, enter the city to
seize control over it. It is also apparent that the platoon
heading west is left behind to take care of the blue artillery
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damental principle in war, stated in the doctrine of most
modern armies, is to never leave enemy forces behind as
one advances.
The game-theoretic problem is concerning the red platoon
heading west and is due to the incident at the petrol station
that may indicate that the red tanks were in desperate need
of fuel. There may, however, be other reasons to why one
stops by at a petrol station. Moreover, even if there was a
problem with the fuel, the tanks were maybe able to refuel
before the petrol station was hit by artillery ﬁre. The ques-
tion regarding fuel becomes very important when about to
give orders to the blue artillery unit regarding his course
of action. If a tank is low on fuel it must use roads because
of the many times higher fuel consumption required when
moving through terrain.
The blue battalion commander has two possible courses
of actions to propose to his artillery unit. Either he can
prepare for a certain battle by digging trenches or he can
choosetoﬂeetowardsH¨ arn¨ osandusingtheroadleadingto
the east. Digging trenches will compensate for the heavy
enemy ﬁre power and yield an even, but certain, battle.
Trying to ﬂee, on the other hand, is more risky. If the red
tanks uses the road and the blue artillery unit manages to
getaway, thiswillyieldasmallproﬁtforthebluesidewho
can gain from the information and people that are saved.
However, if the blue artillery unit chooses to ﬂee and the
red tank platoon travels through the terrain and manages
to intercept, the blue artillery unit will be annihilated and
their weapons will be used for the forthcoming invasion
of H¨ arn¨ osand.
The red commander is neither uncertain about the status
of oneself (out of fuel or not) or the blue unit. The even-
tual choice to either travel using the road or to go through
the terrain has got to do with that he is not aware about
whether the blue artillery unit chooses to dig trenches or
to ﬂee. Also, even if the tanks are not out of fuel it should
not be taken for granted that the best choice is to use
the terrain to accomplish an interception, as the red tank
platoon will then use a large amount of his fuel supplies
which may prove fatal later on. Several historical exam-
ples of the out of fuel scenario exists, with the sinking
of the German battle-ship Bismarck during WW2 being a
well-known example[3].
3. GAME-THEORETIC REASONING
The decision situation that arises in the H¨ arn¨ osand sce-
nario is characterized by its dependency on other actors’
beliefs, desires and intentions. Standard AI tools for solv-
ing decision-making problems in complex situations, such
as dynamic decision networks and inﬂuence diagrams,
are not applicable for these kinds of situations. Game
theory[11], on the other hand, provides a mathematical
framework designed for the analysis of agent interaction
under the assumption of rationality where one tries to
identify the game equilibria as opposed to traditional util-
ity maximization principles. A game component in multi-
agent decision-making thus uses rationality as a tool to
predict the behavior of the other agents. In C2 the need
of such a game component becomes obvious in order to
obtain full situation awareness[13]. In small-scale situ-
ations requiring rapid reaction this need is on the other
hand not as obvious and the game component is maybe
not needed here, since agents’ choices to a large extent
are driven by standard operating procedures obtained by
training and developed using off-line game analyses. On
this level, like in helicopter dogﬁghts, successful develop-
ment of strategies have been obtained with look-ahead in
extensive form, i.e., perfect information game trees with
zero-sum payoffs as reported in [7].
Decision-making in environments where multiple agents
make decisions based on what they think the other agents
mightdoisadifﬁcult problem. Theuseofgametheoryfor
agent design has so far been limited due to lack of under-
standing and lack of standard implementation methods.
We believe, however, that these barriers will be overcome
as more research is focused on the use of game theory for
agent design. The widely used AI book by Russell and
Norvig[12] added a section on game theory just recently,
which indicates that the ideas are new and still need to be
investigated more thoroughly.
One of the earlier mentioned barriers that do exist when
using traditional game theory for agent design is that it as-
sumes that a player will deﬁnitely play the (Nash) equilib-
rium strategy. In some applications, such as the manage-
ment of (own) mobile sensors[6] or the construction of al-
gorithms for efﬁcient network capacity sharing[1], where
the game is a designed mechanism, this is true. However,
these situations must be considered being a small subset
when looking at all the uncertain situations that occur in
our everyday life, where uncertainty regarding both the
other actors and the world as a whole must be accounted
for. In this paper we aim at solving this problem using the
Bayesian game technique which is described below. Other
problems with game theory for agent design are the lack
of methods for combining game theory with traditional
agent control strategies[12] and the lack of standard com-
putational techniques for game-theoretic reasoning[8].
4. STRUCTURING UNCERTAIN INFORMATION
USING GAME THEORY
The extensive form of a game is a tree structure, where a
non-terminal node can describe a chance move by nature
(random draw) or a move possible for one of the partic-
ipants, while a leaf node represents the end of the game
and its payoff after evolving through the path to it. The
immediate descendants of a non-leaf represent the alter-
native outcomes of a chance move (in which case the node
is associated with a probability distribution) or the set of
actions available for the player in turn at this point. This
is adequate for leisure games like chess, a perfect infor-
mation game, but the chess game tree does not ﬁt into
any computer. A deterministic game with full informa-
tion (like generalized chess or checkers) can be solved if
its game tree can be traversed, by bottom-up dynamic pro-15th Mini-EURO Conference: Managing Uncertainty in Decision Support Models
Coimbra, Portugal, September 22–24, 2004
gramming.
In games with imperfect information, the exact position
in the game tree may not be known to players. This is
the case in leisure games of cards, where the hand of a
player is only available to her. The determination of opti-
mal strategies must use a game tree where the decision is
the same for a whole information set, i.e., a set of nodes
for a player where the information available to her is the
same. As an example, at the ﬁrst bid of a game of con-
tract bridge, each of the possible distributions of the cards
not seen by the player is in the same information set. The
bottom-up evaluation does not work, because at the lower
levels of the game tree the players have information on the
hidden information that was communicated by their oppo-
nents’ choices of moves (like the initial round of bidding
in bridge). This situation is solved by putting the game
on strategic form, which means that each combination of
moves for all of a player’s information-equivalent nodes
in the tree, and all chance moves, are listed with their
payoffs. The payoff matrix is typically impossibly large,
and games of this type, like standard variants of poker and
bridge, have no known optimal solution.
The concept of a Bayesian game is fairly complex[5]. A
Bayesian game is a game with incomplete information,
that is, at the starting point of the game the players may
have private information about the game that the others do
not know of. Also, each player expresses its prior belief
about the other players as a probability distribution over
what private information the other players might possess.
The private information is modeled by assigning a type set
for each player consisting of the possible types the player
may possess.
5. MODELING DECISION-MAKING IN COM-
MAND AND CONTROL
U1 U2
G1 G2
C
D1 D2
Doctrine
Terrain
. . .
Figure 2. The C2 process modeled in an inﬂuence dia-
gram. Terrain data bases and doctrine are examples of
variables that characterize a certain type proﬁle.
In [2] we propose a decision support tool for C2 situa-
tion awareness enhancements. The architecture combines
inﬂuence diagrams and game theory according to Fig. 3.
Brieﬂy, the idea is this:
1. We have a number of models of possible world
states, encoded in the form of Bayesian game type
proﬁles, that we need to consider.
2. Each model, depicted in Fig. 2, is represented by an
inﬂuence diagram containing the agents’ goals (Gi),
the agents’ possible courses of actions (Di), the re-
sulting world consequence (C) and the agents’ pay-
off (Ui). Apart from these variables the inﬂuence
diagram is connected to type proﬁle speciﬁc sub di-
agrams containing terrain data bases, doctrine, etc.
3. An important observation regarding the model in
Fig. 2 that motivates the use of game theory is the
factthatthismodel, seenasanordinaryinﬂuence di-
agram, does not account for situations when agents’
try to make decisions that are inﬂuenced by other
agents’ decisions. That is, it is not capable of rep-
resenting circular causal relationships between D1
and D2.
4. For each combination of the decision proﬁle
D1,...,D n we use the inﬂuence diagram to calcu-
late utilities U1,...,U n in order to create an exten-
sive game for each model.
5. Using our prior belief regarding which model is ac-
curate, we obtain a Bayesian game for the whole
decision problem.
6. Calculation of equilibria in the Bayesian game
yields solutions for the decision variables
D1,...,D n in the form of mixed strategy Nash
equilibria.
pi(t−i|ti)
···
Figure 3. Architecture overview. Models are repre-
sented by inﬂuence diagrams that yield payoff values for a
Bayesian game (see Fig. 5 for an example of the resulting
game).
An underlying assumption for the above architecture is
that the modiﬁed inﬂuence diagram in Fig. 2 is indeed a
viable way to model the C2 process. We will not elab-
orate further about this issue but refer to previous work
in [2]. The apparent gaming problem that arises in de-
cision problems where multiple agents reason about each
others’ reasoning and the insufﬁciency of traditional AI
techniques for modeling such situations is motivated fur-
ther in for example [12].15th Mini-EURO Conference: Managing Uncertainty in Decision Support Models
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6. SOLVING THE H¨ ARN ¨ OSAND SCENARIO
The H¨ arn¨ osand scenario possesses several levels of uncer-
tainty which makes the situation ideal for game-theoretic
reasoning. First of all, the blue player is uncertain regard-
ing what game is actually being played, i.e., whether the
red player is out of fuel or not. Modeling this prior infor-
mation requires the use of a Bayesian game. The Bayesian
property is often modeled using a historical chance node
as a root node. This node differs from an ordinary chance
node in that the outcome of this node has already occurred
and is known to a subset of the players when the game
model is formulated and analyzed. In our example there
are only two edges going out from the root node. One
of these edges corresponds to the extensive form game in
Fig. 4 (a) that models the situation when the red player
has got enough fuel. The other edge corresponds to the
extensive form game in Fig. 4 (b) that models the out of
fuel situation.
blue
red red
0,0 1,−1 1,−1 −2,2
DF
RTRT
blue
0,0 1,−1
DF
(a) (b)
Figure 4. The resulting extensive game when the red force
(a) has enough fuel and (b) when the red force is (almost)
out of fuel.
The uncertainty regarding the other player’s decision is
modeled via the use of information sets, i.e., the red player
will not know in advance whether the blue player has cho-
sen to dig trenches (D)o rﬂ e e( F) and therefore is uncer-
tain about whether to try to intercept (T) or not (R), as
his reward from this differ depending on the blue player’s
actions. The ﬁnal expected payoffs depend on the oppo-
nents’ beliefs and on our beliefs. In our model these be-
liefs are obtained from the inﬂuence diagram representing
our current situation awareness, as laid out in [2].
We let α ∈ (0,1) denote the blue player’s belief of the red
player having enough fuel. Solving the game using the
technique described by Harsanyi[5] involves introducing
a historical chance node, a “move of nature”, that deter-
mines the red player’s type, hence transforming the blue
player’s incomplete information about the red player into
imperfect information. The Bayesian equilibrium of the
game is then precisely the Nash equilibrium of this imper-
fect information game. The Harsanyi transformation of
the Bayesian game Γb is depicted in Fig. 5 on extensive
form. Note that several decision nodes share the same la-
bel representing the uncertainties regarding players’ types
and choices. The normal way of solving such a game is to
look at the strategic representation, as seen in Table 1.
In order to solve the game, ﬁrst note that there are no equi-
Nature
blue blue
red red 0,0 1,−1
0,0 1,−1 1,−1 −2,2
α 1 − α
DF D F
RTRT
Figure 5. The Harsanyi transformation of the Bayesian
game represented by the type proﬁles depicted in Fig. 4.
R T
D 0,0 α,−α
F 1,−1 −2α,2α
Table 1. The strategic form of the game in Fig. 5.
libria in pure strategies (just check all four possibilities)
and we have to look for equilibria in mixed strategies. Let
q[D]+(1−q)[F] and s[R]+(1−s)[T] denote the equilib-
rium strategies for the blue and the red player respectively,
where q denotes the probability that the blue player digs
trenches and s the probability that the red player decides
to travel on roads. A requirement for an equilibrium for
the blue player is that his expected payoff is the same for
both D and F, i.e.,
s·0+(1−s)·α = s·1+(1−s)·(−2α) ⇒ s =
3α
1+3 α
Similarly, to make the red player willing to randomize be-
tween R and T, R and T must give her the same expected
utility against q[D]+( 1− q)[F] so that
q·0+(1−q)·(−1) = q·(−α)+(1−q)·2α ⇒ q =
1+2 α
1+3 α
We can now use the equilibrium strategy of the imperfect
information game in order to derive the Bayesian equi-
librium of the game Γb. A Bayesian equilibrium speci-
ﬁes a randomized strategy proﬁle containing one strategy
σi(·|ti) for all combinations of players and types. Hence,
the unique Bayesian equilibrium of the game Γb is
σblue(·|blue) = q[D]+( 1− q)[F],
σred(·|red.enough fuel)=s[R]+( 1− s)[T],
σred(·|red.out of fuel)=[ R],
with q and s deﬁned as above for all values of α ∈ (0,1).15th Mini-EURO Conference: Managing Uncertainty in Decision Support Models
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7. SOLUTION INTERPRETATION
Nash equilibria, often in the form of mixed strategies,
as a solution to decision problems require a moment of
thought. On one hand, it is easy to argue that the equilib-
rium strategy is theoretically sensible. After all, the notion
of Nash equilibria, building on the concept of rational-
ity, deﬁnes precisely this. By using the idea of Bayesian
games we are able to create alternative models regarding
agents that are in some way “irrational”. Thus, by using
Bayesian games we can counterattack any objections on
the existing model by simply extending the model with
a new sub model that models the objection in question.
Of course, this also requires assigning a prior probability
to the new sub model and re-evaluating the prior proba-
bilities for the existing sub models, which makes sense if
someone comes up with an objection (which is interpreted
as a new model that we have not thought of before). If the
objection is independent of the existing models normal-
ization is the natural way to re-assign probabilities. Oth-
erwise it is natural to let the prior probability of the new
model be represented by a reduction of prior probabilities
of the model or the models that it depends on. In most
cases we believe that it is appropriate to have a separate
model for the “uncertain case” that takes care of whatever
we have not thought of. In that case the new model, pro-
vided it is independent of other existing models, typically
reduces our overall uncertainty regarding the situation and
thus causes a reduction of prior probability for the earlier
mentioned “uncertain case”. Models that takes care of the
rest, i.e., that represent models that we are not yet aware
of, are often found in proposed architectures for multi-
agent modeling, see for example [4].
On the other hand, although representing the theoretically
rational course of action, the Nash equilibrium poses sev-
eral concerns regarding its interpretation. Looking at the
H¨ arn¨ osand scenario, it is interesting to see how q and s
varies depending on α which is depicted in the diagram
in Fig. 6, i.e., how the solution to our decision problem
varies depending on our subjective beliefs regarding the
out of fuel situation. How do we convince a comman-
der that he should decide what to do by throwing a die
that varies depending on q(α)? As an example, consider
the situation when we do not know anything and assign
equal probabilities to the two models (fuel or out of fuel).
Then the blue player should dig trenches with probability
q(0.5) = 0.8 and the red player should choose to travel
by roads with probability s(0.5) = 0.6 although his fuel
supply would allow for an interception. The conclusion
regarding the H¨ arn¨ osand scenario is that a simple prob-
lem gives us a solution that is difﬁcult to understand intu-
itively. Unfortunately, this is quite typical (see for exam-
ple [2] for another example) and we need to address the
question of how to use the solution in a sensible way. A
computer may use a probability distribution as a random-
ized solution concept. A human, on the other hand, will
probably not be perfectly satisﬁed with throwing a die and
we cannot accept that he decides what to do by reasoning
regarding what to do based on the obtained mixed strat-
egy. To actually throw the die is part of the solution and if
this is not performed the commander is not rational and,
hence, will be outperformed by a rational opponent that is
capable of modeling this behavior.
0.6
1
0.6
0.4 0.2
0.4
0
0.2
alpha
0.8 1
0.8
0
Figure 6. q(α) (upper curve) and s(α) (lower curve).
Besides the problem with the interpretation there are other
problems of more “technical nature” that need to be ad-
dressed such as the problem of ﬁnding algorithms that
compute equilibria in reasonable time and the problem of
dealing with multiple equilibra. Typically, in a C2 deci-
sion situation we are going to be dealing with games that
are more complex than the example in section 6 where the
game was small, zero-sum and only contained two play-
ers.
8. CONCLUSIONS
Gaming is inevitably an inherent part of Command and
Control decision-making. In fact, for commanders wish-
ing to optimize their decisions in complex multi-agent en-
vironments, understanding the rules of the game is often
the same thing as understanding the decision problem it-
self. After all, this is what long-term planning is all about,
i.e., taking into account one’s knowledge or expectation
of other decision makers’ behavior to form a systematical
description of the outcomes that may emerge. By extend-
ing readily available and accepted single-agent reasoning
engines in the form of Bayesian networks and its exten-
sions with a “game component” we form an architecture
that we believe is well suited for C2 reasoning.
More realistic and complex scenarios are required to ob-
tain full understanding of the difﬁculties and the possi-
bilities that a game-theoretic solution yields. The solu-
tion concept in the form of mixed strategy Nash equi-
libria rests on well-established grounds, but unfortunately
the solution itself is often non-trivial and therefore some15th Mini-EURO Conference: Managing Uncertainty in Decision Support Models
Coimbra, Portugal, September 22–24, 2004
level of understanding of the underlying concepts is re-
quired. Further research is needed regarding how to es-
tablish such understanding. Our belief is that the de-
velopment of game-theoretic tools must be made in par-
allel with the development of planning methods for C2
decision-making which will facilitate in establishing such
understanding as well as ensuring that the result matches
the actual decision-making process. We believe the latter
to be an important usability aspect that needs to be con-
sidered in further research and development.
Our ideas assume that each decision maker is “rational”
in the sense that he is aware of his alternatives, forms ex-
pectations about any unknowns, has clear preferences, and
chooses his action deliberately after some process of opti-
mization. The assumption of rationality is not undisputed,
being under perpetual attack by experimental psycholo-
gists who point out severe limits to its application[11].
However, we believe that the use of Bayesian games to
a large extent can compensate for irrational behavior. An
architecture based on Bayesian games is well suited for
incorporating models of “irrationality”. Furthermore, we
wish to stress that the architecture we propose is intended
to be used by a decision maker as a decision support tool.
It is not in any way supposed to be used for automatic
decision-makingassomekindof“decisionmakerreplace-
ment”. Hence, there is no need to be suspicious regarding
development of such a decision support tool. Ignoring it
would be as foolish as ignoring the weather forecast when
planning for a barbecue.
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